The Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on Investment Recommendations: Analysts' Perceptions and Shifting Institutional Logics by Ioannou & Serafeim, Georgios
 
The Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on Investment
Recommendations: Analysts' Perceptions and Shifting Institutional
Logics
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Ioannou, Ioannis, and George Serafeim. "The Impact of Corporate
Social Responsibility on Investment Recommendations: Analysts'
Perceptions and Shifting Institutional Logics." Strategic
Management Journal (forthcoming).
Published Version doi:10.1002/smj.2268
Accessed February 19, 2015 5:10:21 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12534952
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#OAP1 
 
 
 
The Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on Investment Recommendations: 
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Abstract 
We explore the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) ratings on sell-side analysts’ assessments 
of firms’ future financial performance. We suggest that when analysts perceive CSR as an agency cost, due 
to the prevalence of an agency logic, they produce pessimistic recommendations for firms with high CSR 
ratings. Moreover, we theorize that over time, the emergence of a stakeholder focus, and the gradual 
weakening of the agency logic, shifts the analysts’ perceptions of CSR ratings and results in increasingly 
less pessimistic recommendations for firms with high CSR ratings. Using a large sample of publicly traded 
US  firms  over  15  years,  we  confirm  that  in  the  early  1990s,  analysts  issue  more  pessimistic 
recommendations for firms with high CSR ratings. However, in more recent years analysts progressively 
assess these firms less pessimistically, and eventually they assess them optimistically. Furthermore, we find 
that more experienced analysts and analysts at higher-status brokerage houses are the first to shift the 
relation between CSR ratings and investment recommendation optimism. We find no significant link 
between firms’ CSR ratings and analysts’ forecast errors, indicating that learning is unlikely to account for 
the observed shifts in recommendations.    
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INTRODUCTION 
  In recent years, a growing number of companies are adopting various corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) initiatives - the voluntary incorporation of social and environmental issues into a company’s business 
model and operations (European Commission 2001) – in an attempt to meet the needs and expectations of 
a range of stakeholders, including but not confined to the company’s shareholders. Meanwhile, numerous 
information intermediaries have been established to gather and make publicly available information about 
these CSR initiatives – what is termed as “CSR ratings” or “CSR scores” – thus rating and ranking 
corporations across several dimensions of environmental, social, and corporate governance performance. 
Not only information intermediaries, but also a number of voluntary reporting standards have emerged to 
enable these information intermediaries to standardize the way they disclose their CSR ratings. Therefore, 
CSR scores have increasingly become more credible but also more easily comparable across industries and 
geographies. The adoption and implementation of CSR policies as well as the availability of CSR scores, 
has in fact generated a growing interest by financial markets, and investment analysts in particular (Eccles, 
Krzus & Serafeim 2011). Accordingly, given the pivotal role that financial markets play in the allocation 
of scarce capital resources and in the derivation of a company’s market value, understanding whether and 
in what ways these markets assess a firm’s CSR scores is critical. In this article, and in order to explore this 
issue, we follow extensive prior research in adopting a sociological approach towards the processes and 
mechanisms associated with the assessment of corporate policies by financial markets (Zuckerman, 1999; 
Cetina & Bruegger, 2002; MacKenzie, 2003; Zajac & Westphal, 2004; Lok, 2010).  
Specifically, we adopt a social constructionist view of financial markets and explore how the 
weakening of the prevalent agency logic, due to the emergence of a stakeholder orientation, is associated 
with a shift in the way analysts respond to CSR ratings over a 15-year time horizon. Our theory derives 
from a neo-institutional perspective which argues that organizational policies achieve legitimacy to the 
extent  that  they  are  consistent  with  prevailing  institutional  logics  or  ‘historically-variant  sets  of 
assumptions, beliefs, values, and rules by which individuals … interpret organizational reality and what 3 
 
constitutes appropriate behavior’ (Thornton & Ocasio (1999): p.805; see also Zajac & Westphal (2004): 
p.433). We posit that within an institutional context whereby CSR initiatives are perceived as serving 
managerial  objectives  (i.e.  an  agency  cost)  rather  than  serving  shareholders’  interests  (Atkinson  & 
Galaskiewicz, 1988; Galaskiewicz, 1997), analysts’ reactions in the form of investment recommendations 
will be more pessimistic the higher the CSR scores of the focal company are. Subsequently, we argue for a 
gradual  weakening  of  this  agency-based  institutional  logic  through  the  emergence  of  a  stakeholder 
orientation. Within this emerging perspective, CSR increasingly becomes more legitimate in the eyes of 
both shareholders and analysts, and is consequently perceived as a set of activities that companies should 
undertake as insurance-like protection for the relationship-based intangible assets (Godfrey, 2005) or even 
as activities that may positively contribute towards profitability (Margolis, Elfenbein, & Walsh, 2007). 
Therefore, we posit that in later time periods, companies with higher CSR scores will be associated with 
increasingly less pessimistic analysts’ recommendations, and eventually, they may even be associated with 
optimistic recommendations.  
Relatedly, prior articles have explored how a shift in the prevalent institutional logic may lead to 
changes in the interpretation of a particular corporate policy. For example, Zajac et al. (2004) show that the 
market’s reaction to stock repurchase plans changes as the prevalent logic shifts: while under a “corporate 
logic” the market reacts positively to stock repurchase plans, under an agency logic it reacts negatively 
towards the very same plans.  Similarly, a series of articles by Thornton and co-authors focused on the 
publishing industry show that a shift from an “editorial” logic to a “market” logic results in changes in 
executive succession, organizational structure and even acquisition targets (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; 
Thornton, 2001, 2002). Importantly, scholars have also explored the reactions and evaluations of market 
intermediaries, observers and external third parties when companies adopt strategies consistent with or even 
in contrast to the prevailing or shifting institutional logic (e.g. Polos, Hannan, & Carroll, 2002; Hannan, 
Polos, & Carroll, 2004; Durand, Rao, & Monin, 2007; Philippe & Durand, 2011).  4 
 
In this article, we theoretically argue and empirically test for the link between the weakening of the 
agency  logic  through  the  emergence  of  a  stakeholder  orientation,  and  investment  analysts’ 
recommendations for firms with high CSR scores, using a large sample of publicly traded US firms for the 
period 1993 to 2007. Specifically, using consensus (mean) analyst recommendation in the focal firm-year 
as the dependent variable, and  a composite CSR strengths  score constructed with data from Kinder, 
Lyndenberg and Domini (KLD) as the independent variable of interest, we find that in the early 1990s, 
analysts issue more pessimistic recommendations for firms with high CSR scores. Over time and leading 
to 2007, analysts issue increasingly less pessimistic and eventually, optimistic recommendations for firms 
with higher CSR scores. In addition, we argue that more experienced analysts as well as higher-status 
brokerage houses are more likely to be the first to shift their reactions towards less pessimistic (more 
optimistic) recommendations for such firms. We therefore  develop and provide evidence  for a more 
nuanced understanding of the sociological processes associated with the perceptions and assessments of 
firms with high CSR scores by analysts during times of change in the prevailing institutional logic. 
With our work we make some other key contributions. First, we contribute to the literature that 
explores the sociological mechanisms through which corporate policies are perceived and interpreted by 
the financial markets (Zuckerman, 1999; Zajac & Westphal, 2004); more specifically, we contribute to the 
sub-stream of literature that explores the role of intermediaries during periods when the prevailing logic 
shifts (Polos et al., 2002; Hannan et al., 2004; Durand et al., 2007; Philippe & Durand, 2011). Second, to 
the best of our knowledge, this article is the first to explore both theoretically and empirically, the role of 
investment analysts and the processes that affect their reactions in the context of CSR ratings. Importantly, 
it is the first one to empirically document the emergence of a new logic (i.e. a stakeholder orientation) that 
appears to be weakening the dominant logic (i.e. agency) of the last forty or so years in financial markets. 
We also contribute to the literature stream within CSR that seeks to understand the link between CSR and 
the derivation of firm value in financial markets (e.g. Lee & Faff, 2009; El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok et al., 
2011; Goss & Roberts, 2011; Cheng, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2014). Third, our article is linked to the recent 5 
 
literature in strategy that explores analysts’ reactions as firms respond to radical technological change as 
well  as  how  these  reactions  affect  firms’  subsequent  responses  (Benner,  2007,  2010;  Benner  & 
Ranganathan, 2012). To the extent that analysts’ reactions may develop into institutional pressures, the 
evidence we provide here hints towards the pressure that financial markets will be exerting on companies 
to adopt more CSR policies in the future. Whereas most of the prior work on social construction of capital 
markets has focused on issues of governance (e.g. stock repurchase plans, or incentives provision), our 
work broadens the theoretical scope of social construction theory to argue that in addition to corporate 
governance issues, social construction may intrinsically affect the perception and evaluation by analysts of 
social and environmental initiatives that companies implement. Similarly, whereas the strategy literature to 
date  has  explored  analysts’  reactions  to  predominantly  financial  metrics  or  radical  technological 
innovations, our article broadens the scope of this literature as well, by exploring the impact of non-financial 
metrics on investment recommendations. Finally, since CSR is generally regarded as a set of policies 
adopted by corporations to meet the demands and expectations of multiple stakeholders, our article explores 
how a shifting logic affects the perception and evaluation of such firm policies by a key stakeholder and 
social actor in the capital markets, namely sell-side analysts.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
From Agency to Stakeholder Logics of CSR 
Numerous articles have documented the emergence and institutionalization of the agency logic of corporate 
control according to which a corporation is regarded as merely a nexus of contractual arrangements between 
individuals (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Williamson & Winter, 1993; Zajac & Westphal, 2004). Thus, 
managers are assumed to be fungible agents of shareholders who are likely to pursue corporate actions that 
advance their own personal interests at the expense of shareholder value (e.g. Fama & Jensen, 1983b, 1983a; 
Useem, 1993; Davis & Thompson, 1994; Westphal & Zajac, 1995; Useem, 1996; Zajac & Westphal, 2004). 
According to Zajac & Westphal (2004) and other scholars, such strong agency assumptions resulted in the 
surfacing of a different model of economic resource allocation termed as “investor capitalism.” Assuming 6 
 
that a firm is simply a set of contracts and that managerial action results in significant agency costs, the 
“investor capitalism” model postulates that the capital allocation process is better left to investors rather 
than managers (p. 436).  Thus, contrary to existing dominant beliefs under a “corporate” logic, managers 
and executives were no longer regarded as “professionals with unique strategic knowledge that is required 
for efficient allocation of corporate resources” (Zajac & Westphal, 2004: 436). As expected, a number of 
corporate policies were viewed and interpreted through the lens of this agency logic. For example, Zajac & 
Westphal  (1995)  show  that  in  the  mid-to-late  1980s,  executive  incentive  plans  were  justified  as  a 
mechanism to align managerial and shareholder interests rather than a mechanism to attract and retain 
scarce executive talent. Moreover, Zajac & Westphal (2004) show that due to the switch to the agency 
logic, stock market reactions to repurchase plan adoptions shifted from negative to positive over time. 
  In  the  accounting  and  finance  literature  numerous  articles  provide  evidence  that  investment 
analysts’ expectations of a focal company’s future growth and performance are in fact a good proxy for the 
expectations of the company’s own shareholders (Fried & Givoly, 1982; O’Brien, 1988; Abarbanell, Lanen, 
& Verrecchia, 1995). More generally, these sell-side analysts are employed by brokerage houses and 
research firms, they track the performance of a specific set of firms over time, and they generate and publish 
two main products: forecasts of future earnings as well as investment recommendations that clients buy, 
sell, or hold their shares in the stocks of these firms. The same literature provides ample evidence that 
market participants extensively use these products, and documents their significant influence over stock 
prices and trading volumes  (Stickel, 1995;  Womack, 1996; Francis & Soffer, 1997; Barber, Lehavy, 
McNichols et al., 2001). From a sociological perspective, Zuckerman (1999) notes that “analysts serve as 
“surrogate investors” (cf. Hirsch (1972)) in that their recommendations and forecasts significantly affect 
investor appetite for a firm’s shares. Indeed, while analysts often disagree amongst themselves on a firm’s 7 
 
prospects (Kandel & Pearson, 1995), certain currents of opinion, especially when voiced by prominent 
analysts, significantly influence prices.”1 (p.1408) 
Starting in the early 1990s, investment analysts started to witness the growing interest of companies 
in adopting CSR programs, and began to explore publicly available CSR ratings and rankings provided by 
third parties. For example, Paine (2003) reports the results from two early surveys of investors regarding 
the broader domain of CSR and ethics: in the first one, a survey of US investors in 1993, 72% claimed to 
consider a company’s ethics when deciding whether to invest in its stock.2 Importantly, a second survey 
conducted in 1994 found that 26% of investors said that a company’s business practices and ethics were 
extremely important to their investment decisions.3 Paine (2003) then concludes that  “whether or not 
investors themselves [were] are directly concerned about corporate conduct, they recognize[d] that others’ 
concerns can translate into financial consequences for the companies they invest in”.  
However, early interpretations of CSR within the investor community appear to have been heavily 
based on arguments that served as precursors to the subsequent formalization of agency theory: noticeably, 
Nobel laureate Milton Friedman famously contended in 1970 in the New York Times Magazine that “the 
social responsibility of the firm is to increase its profits” (Friedman, 1970) and even earlier, in his seminal 
1962 book, he stated that “few trends could so thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free 
society as the acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to make as much money 
for their stockholders as possible”(p.133) (Friedman, 1962). In fact, Freeman et al. (2010) note: “Milton 
                                                           
1Relatedly Cohen et al. (2010) note “that sell-side analysts have an incentive to produce unbiased forecasts and recommendations 
for investors only if they are compensated for such behavior. Due to a lack of data on direct compensation, the literature generally 
tests this idea by linking analyst behavior to measures of implicit incentives or career concerns. Stickel (1992) finds that highly 
rated “All-American” analysts (who are typically better compensated than other analysts) are more accurate earnings forecasters 
than other analysts, suggesting that accuracy is rewarded. Similarly, Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (1999) document that poor 
relative performance leads to job turnover.” 
2According to Paine (2003), Corporate Ethics in America is a research study commissioned by the Society of Consumer Affairs 
Professionals in Business Foundation and conducted by the Gallup Organization (Arlington, VA.: SOCAP Foundation, 1993), 
pp.15-16  
3Results of the survey conducted by the Council on Foundations and Walker Information in 1994 and are noted in Walker 
Information, Measurements, vol. 7, no. 4 (Indianapolis, Ind.: Walker Information, 1998), p.2. 8 
 
Friedman’s writings on social responsibility and the purpose of the firm have become canonical. Indeed, 
much of the writing within finance, economics, and management for the past twenty-five years assumes not 
only that his views – about why firms exist and to whom manages have obligations – are correct, but also 
that existing US law is built upon them (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Marens & Wicks, 1999)” (p.202). 
Although such socially legitimate critiques of CSR-type policies predated the formal introduction and 
institutionalization of agency theory, it is apparent that to a considerable extent, they may well be viewed 
as precursors to agency theory itself. Indeed, as Lee (2008) notes, opponents of CSR during the 1960s and 
1970s argued for segregated roles of economic and political actors and therefore, they advocated that social 
problems should be left to politicians and civil society to deal with (p. 56). Thus, they perceived economic 
and social goals to be separate and typically in conflict.4 In a similar spirit, later studies by Dewatripont, 
Jewitt & Tirole   (1999)  argued  that CSR may weaken managerial accountability  and  Atkinson & 
Galaskiewicz (1988) focused on one aspect of CSR – namely, charitable giving – and showed that firms 
with high levels of CEO ownership give less generously to charities than firms with low levels of CEO 
ownership. They interpret this finding as evidence of better alignment between CEO and shareholder 
incentives when CEO ownership is higher.5  
Influenced by the overarching agency logic, analysts and investors interpreted CSR as meeting the 
expectations of non-shareholding stakeholders, and in the process destroying shareholder wealth (i.e. they 
perceived CSR merely as a transfer payment). This is not to imply of course, that advocates of CSR did not 
exist during this time (see for example early works by (Andrews, 1971; Steiner, 1971; Davis, 1973; Sethi, 
                                                           
4 We note that such views already contained important commonalities with the agency logic, even though they also contained some 
differences. For example, the business community regarded social responsibility as bad for business in the 1960s and early 1970s, 
yet this is a view that does not necessarily require that managers are self-maximizing at the expense the shareholders (as the 
formalized agency theory would predict). We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to us. 
5 Overall though, empirical work at the time found mixed results regarding the existence of agency costs. For example, (Navarro, 
1988) finds that charitable contributions can be profit maximizing if they act as a kind of advertising expense or a quasi -fringe 
benefit for employees. Also, in a follow-up article, (Galaskiewicz, 1997) finds mixed support for agency theory; a large outside 
shareholder has no impact on contributions. If agency costs were present, a large outside shareholder would exercise more control 
over management and therefore lower charitable contributions. 9 
 
1975;  Carroll,  1979).  Nonetheless,  the  institutionalization  of  the  agency  logic  as  documented  in  the 
literature, not only gave stronger social legitimacy to prior arguments against CSR-type policies but also, 
it appears to have dominated analysts’ and investors’ perceptions and interpretations of both CSR as well 
as several other corporate policies (Useem, 1993; Davis & Thompson, 1994; Westphal & Zajac, 1994; 
Useem, 1996; Zajac & Westphal, 2004). Against this background, we posit that in the early 1990s under 
the prevalence of the agency logic, the perceptions of the investment community for firms that undertook 
CSR were predominantly unfavorable, and therefore we predict that sell-side analysts’ recommendations 
were more pessimistic towards firms with higher CSR scores.  
Moreover, we argue that the subsequent gradual emergence and institutionalization of what has 
been termed as the “Business Case for CSR” (Margolis et al., 2007) and the collective realization that CSR 
may be an insurance-like protection for the relationship-based intangible assets of a company (Godfrey, 
2005) or a risk-mitigation strategy, have weakened the agency logic by bringing to the forefront a wider 
stakeholder focus. Therefore, we suggest that after the early 1990s, analysts’ perceptions and interpretations 
of  CSR  will  be  affected  by  this  shift  in  logics  and  hence,  their  recommendations  will  become  less 
unfavorable, and may even become favorable towards firms with high CSR ratings. Next, we present 
several  compelling  reasons  for  why  the  interpretation  of  CSR  through  an  agency  logic  is  gradually 
weakened by the emergence of a stakeholder orientation. 
First, in many countries around the world, and especially in Europe, the socially responsible 
investing  (SRI)  movement  has  been  gaining  significant  momentum  within  the  analyst  and  investor 
communities, and it increasingly constitutes a non-negligible part of the global financial market.  While 
developing into its modern form, the SRI shifted away from an emphasis on ethics and towards the 
incorporation of environmental, social and governance factors (i.e. CSR ratings) into investment decisions. 
This type of integration became an investment strategy aimed at improving the risk-return profile of the 
SRI portfolios but also, one that explicitly seeks to outperform the market rather than simply articulate an 10 
 
ethical stance on behalf of its investors (Sparkes & Cowton, 2004)6. Paine (2003) estimates that if one 
accounts for assets in all socially screened portfolios “the sector grew at a compound annualized rate of 
74% between 1995 and 1999, compared to a rate of 25% for all mutual fund assets” to reach a total of $1.5 
trillion under management by 1999 (compared to $16.3 trillion of total assets under management). She also 
notes that throughout the 1990s, a number of mainstream brokerage firms launched funds and other 
products to appeal to this sector, including Merrill Lunch, Smith Barney, Vanguard, UBS and Credit Suisse. 
It is estimated that by 2015, global SRI will reach $26.5 trillion assets under management, representing 
over 15% of the global total (Booz & Company 2012). 
Reflecting the increasing penetration and institutionalization of the SRI wave in the analyst and 
investor community, in 2003 the UNEP Finance Initiative (UNEP FI) found that “agreement [among 
analysts] that environmental, social and corporate governance issues affect long-term shareholder value… 
[and] in some cases those effects may be profound”. Two years later, in 2006, the UN launched the 
Principles  for  Responsible  Investing  (UN  PRI)  mainstreaming  SRI  and  coined  the  definition  of 
“Responsible Investors” as those investors who incorporate environmental, social and governance factors 
into their investment process.7 Relatedly, Sparkes, and Cowton (2004) perform a comprehensive review of 
the SRI literature and conclude that SRI “has become an investment philosophy adopted by a growing 
proportion of large investment institutions” and that “this shift in SRI from margin to mainstream and the 
position in which institutional investors find themselves is leading to a new form of SRI shareholder 
pressure” (p.45, emphasis added). By the mid-2000s, even the language within the analyst and investor 
                                                           
6 Indicatively, we note that by 2007, mutual funds that integrated CSR ratings in their capital allocation decisions had assets under 
management of more than $2.5 and $2 trillion dollars in the United States and Europe respectively. Similarly, socially conscious 
funds in Canada, Japan and Australia held $500, $100 and $64 billion, respectively. In the last ten years, assets under management 
of socially responsible investors grew considerably: funds in the United States, United Kingdom and Canada grew by $400, $600, 
and $400 billion respectively, between 2001 and 2007. We calculated these numbers from information provided by national and 
international organizations that track socially conscious funds, such as Eurosif, Social Investment Forum, Responsible Investment 
Association Australasia, Social Responsible Organization, and SRI funds in Asia. 
7 By April 2012, the UN PRI Global Network included more than 1,000 signatories with assets under management of approximately 
$35 trillion. United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment, Annual Report 2012, (http://www.unpri.org/viewer/?file=wp-
content/uploads/Annualreport20121.pdf) 11 
 
community began to shift: environmental, social and governance issues were now being jointly labeled as 
“corporate sustainability”, rather than merely issues of CSR. This new terminology drew attention to the 
fact that in addition to perpetual profitability (i.e. sustainable shareholder returns), corporations had to be 
sustainable, and indeed thrive within their broader social and environmental context. 
Another important milestone in the US was the establishment of a pressure group under the name 
of “Ceres”, as early as 1989, by a group of North American investors whose goal was to leverage the 
collective power of its investors to encourage both companies as well as capital markets to incorporate 
environmental issues into their day-to-day decision-making. By now, Ceres represents one of the world’s 
strongest  investment  groups  with  over  60  institutional  investors  managing  over  $4  trillion  in  assets. 
Meanwhile, sustainability indices that emerged at stock exchanges around the world also captured the 
attention of analysts and investors and reflected the further institutionalization of CSR.  In 1999 for 
example, the Dow Jones Sustainability Index was formed to evaluate the sustainability performance of the 
largest 2,500 companies listed on the Dow Jones Global Total Stock Market Index. Several other indices 
followed suit amongst which the most prominent were the FTSE4GOOD index, Ethibel, Domini 400 Social 
Index,  Vanguard  Calvert  Social  Index  Fund  and  the  Corporate  Governance  Quotient  (CGQ).  Such 
developments reflected and even reinforced the weakening of the prevalent agency logic, since CSR was 
much less likely to be interpreted by the analyst community as an agency cost but rather, CSR was seen as 
a means through which to address stakeholder needs and expectations.  
Several key innovations in the governance and disclosure process of companies also reinforced a 
broader  stakeholder  focus:  the  number  of  environmental  and  social  issues  that  were  the  subject  of 
shareholder resolutions in the US increased significantly (Glac, 2010; Carroll, Lipartito, Post et al., 2012) 
and these resolutions were increasingly becoming more successful (Mathiasen, Mell, & Gallimore, 2012). 
Paine (2003) notes that by the year 2000, 242 out of a total 820 proposals submitted as part of the proxy 
process in the US, were directly related to issues of the “environment, equal employment, and international 
labor and human rights issues”. From 2008 through the first half of 2010, more than 200 institutional 12 
 
investors and money managers, collectively controlling a total of at least $1.5 trillion in assets, filed or co-
filed shareholder resolutions on environmental, social and governance issues. Moreover, a new C-level 
executive position was established at many companies around the world (e.g. AT&T, Blackstone, BT, Dow 
Chemical, Nestle, SAP, Siemens, Unilever, among many others) to oversee sustainability-related issues. 
Thus, CSR was no longer a peripheral issue (e.g. philanthropy) but rather, it increasingly became a core 
strategic issue and a potential driver of innovation and long-term performance (Lubin & Esty, 2010; Kiron, 
Kruschwitz, Haanaes et al., 2012). At the same time, the exponential growth of sustainability reporting as 
well as its current transition to integrated reporting reflected the critical need to communicate such issues 
to the analysts and markets.8  
In sum, the above trends jointly point at an emerging shift in institutional logics within the analyst 
community and the financial markets towards a stakeholder orientation and therefore, a re-interpretation of 
CSR as a legitimate part of corporate strategy, minimizing operational risks and even contributing positively 
towards long-term financial performance. Concurrently, stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984; Freeman, 
Harrison, & Wicks, 2007; Freeman et al., 2010) highlighted how critical it is for managers to integrate in 
their decision-making process the interests and expectations of a broad and diverse set of stakeholders, 
rather than to focus exclusively on the corporation’s shareholders as previously supported by the agency 
logic. In fact, prior studies argue that ties with key stakeholders may mitigate the likelihood of negative 
regulatory, legislative or fiscal action (Freeman, 1984; Berman, Wicks, Kotha et al., 1999; Hillman & 
Keim, 2001), attract socially conscious consumers (Hillman & Keim, 2001), attract financial resources from 
socially responsive investors (Kapstein, 2001), enhance access to finance (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2013) or 
help poorly performing firms to recover from disadvantageous positions more quickly (Choi & Wang, 
2009). In addition, stakeholder theory argues that CSR may lead to better performance by protecting and 
enhancing corporate reputation (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Fombrun, 2005; Freeman et al., 2007).   
                                                           
8 For example, while only 26 firms issued a sustainability report in 1992, this number grew to 5,162 by 2010 (Eccles et al., 2011). 
Concurrently, national governments and stock exchanges have promoted sustainability reporting by adopting laws and regulations 
that specifically mandate this form of disclosure (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012).  13 
 
Empirically, numerous academic articles to date have sought to uncover the link between CSR and 
financial performance (e.g. McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; Rowley & Berman, 2000; Hillman & Keim, 2001; 
Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003; Barnett & Salomon, 2006) albeit, without 
directly exploring the perception of CSR by investment analysts. A comprehensive meta-analysis of this 
stream  of  work  by  Margolis  et  al.  (2007)  finds  a  small  positive  yet  significant  impact  of  CSR  on 
profitability. The most recent article by Eccles et al. (2013) uses a matched sample methodology and finds 
that  sustainable  organizations  –  defined  as  those  organizations  that  voluntarily  integrate  social  and 
environmental issues into their strategy and business models – outperform their lower sustainability peers 
over an 18 year horizon, both in stock market as well as operational performance.  
Similarly,  a  long  stream  of  literature  explores  the  link  between  environmental  performance 
specifically, and financial performance (e.g. Russo & Fouts, 1997; King & Lenox, 2001; King & Lenox, 
2002) while several literature reviews (Sharma & Starik, 2002; Etzion, 2007; Ambec & Lanoie, 2008; 
Dixon-Fowler, Slater, Johnson et al., 2013) support the general finding of a positive relationship between 
environmental and financial performance. In particular, the main arguments in these studies are that positive 
environmental performance may represent a focus on innovation and operational efficiency  (e.g. Porter & 
Van der Linde, 1995), reflect superior organizational or management capabilities (e.g. Aragón-Correa, 
1998), enhance a company’s legitimacy (e.g. Hart, 1995), and may empower the firm to meet the needs of 
diverse stakeholders (e.g. Edward Freeman & Evan, 1991). Consequently, these academic findings jointly 
provide solid justification and perhaps additional legitimization within the investment community for 
interpreting and assessing corporate engagement with CSR through a stakeholder lens. Summarizing all of 
the above discussion then, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Over time, sell-side analysts’ recommendations will be less pessimistic for firms with 
high CSR scores.  
Although this trend may be traced, on average, across all analysts, it is also worth exploring how 
heterogeneity within the analyst community itself, in conjunction with the weakening of the agency logic, 14 
 
is  associated  with  a  potential  shift  in  their  investment  recommendations  over  time.  Exploring  this 
heterogeneity also provides a more nuanced understanding of the underlying sociological processes that 
affect the derivation of firm value in financial markets during times of change in the overarching logic. On 
the one hand, if one adheres to a strict version of the efficient market hypothesis, none of the analyst 
attributes  should  matter:  the  potential  advantages  of  any  capital  market  participant  are  immediately 
eliminated through the exploitation of arbitrage opportunities (for an overview see Sheffrin (1996)). Fama 
(1965) for example, argues that analyst forecasts and recommendations are inconsequential for investors 
and therefore, analysts should disappear, if the theory is right.  
In this article on the other hand, we concur with existing literature arguing that there is at least a 
“loose, socially mediated link” (Podolny, 1993) between an analyst’s experience and status and the quality 
of her investment recommendations, similar to what has been suggested in other settings (e.g. Posner 
(1990) on judges; (Schwartz, 1987; Fine, 1996) on politicians; (Lang & Lang, 1988; Kapsis, 1989) on 
artists; Phillips & Zuckerman (2001) on analysts). In particular, prior work (Stickel, 1992; Sinha, Brown, 
& Das, 1997; Clement, 1999) has documented systematic and time-persistent differences in analysts’ 
earnings  forecast  accuracy,  and  some  articles  have  explained  why  this  occurs  by  linking  analyst 
performance to observable analyst heterogeneity. Indicatively, Clement (1999) finds that a focal analyst’s 
forecast  accuracy  is  “positively  associated  with  general  and  firm-specific  forecasting  experience  and 
employer size, and negatively associated with the number of firms and industries followed by the analyst” 
(p.287).  
Following this line of work, we regard analyst experience as a key variable for understanding the 
heterogeneity  across  the  analyst  population  in  terms  of  their  perceptions  and  associated  investment 
recommendations. Focusing on analyst experience is also consistent with the presence of a Matthew effect 
in that higher-status actors (i.e. more experienced and therefore, more successful analysts) are likely to be 
more protected for infringing norms than lower-status actors (Podolny, 1993; Rao, 1994; Durand et al., 
2007);  therefore,  they  are  more  likely  to  switch  behaviour  to  conform  to  an  alternative  emerging 15 
 
institutional logic, that potentially weakens a previously established one. Empirically, work by Phillips and 
Zuckerman (2001) shows that higher-status actors – in their case, Silicon Valley law firms and analysts – 
are more likely to defy prevailing norms and role prescriptions, since they enjoy a higher degree of security 
in their role incumbency. Indeed, Phillips and Zuckerman (2001) even postulate a U-shaped relationship 
between status and conformity, arguing that low-status actors may feel free to defy accepted practice and 
are also likely to deviate from expected norms since they have little to lose and are excluded regardless of 
their actions (p. 380).  
However, Hong et al. (2000) empirically document that analysts with less experience (equivalently, 
lower status) are more likely to exhibit herding behavior (i.e. to conform), and thus, they are more likely to 
be terminated due to inaccurate forecasts. In our context, fewer years of experience and resulting herding 
behavior would therefore be associated with a higher likelihood of conforming to the prevailing agency 
logic, and therefore a lower likelihood of shifting towards more optimistic recommendations when a new 
logic in the form of a stakeholder orientation begins to emerge. Relatedly, Mikhail et al. (2003) find that 
analysts  who  have  more  firm-specific  forecasting  experience  generate  more  accurate  forecasts  and 
positively affect the degree of information reflected in a firm’s market price. Consequently, we expect that 
analysts with the most experience will be the first to switch from unfavorable to favorable assessments of 
CSR scores over time whereas, given the findings of Hong et al. (2000), we would not expect to observe 
deviations for the lowest-status analysts due to the higher likelihood of herding. In sum, we posit that the 
most experienced analysts – equivalently, highest status – are more likely to defy the norms imposed by an 
agency  logic  and  consequently,  they  are  more  likely  to  be  the  first  to  issue  more  favourable 
recommendations for firms with high CSR scores, reflecting the emergence of an institutional focus on 
stakeholders. Thus, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Over time, analysts with more experience are the first to become less pessimistic 
towards firms with high CSR scores. 16 
 
In addition to the analyst community, status heterogeneity across brokerage houses constitutes 
another important factor that may plausibly affect the interpretation of firms’ CSR ratings. In particular, 
Phillips and Zuckerman (2001) suggest that brokerage houses may be divided into two “hemispheres”: 
brokerage houses of higher and lower status. Although the role of the analysts across the two hemispheres 
is comparable, high-status brokerage houses (e.g. Goldman Sachs) are more likely to cater primarily to the 
needs of large corporations and institutional investors whereas a low-status brokerage house is more likely 
to cater to the needs of individual or ‘retail’ investors and various niche clientele (p.394) (Eccles & Crane, 
1987; Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001). Thus, to be able to meet the demands and expectations of their 
sophisticated clientele in numerous industries, high-status brokerage houses require more resources as well 
as more human capital; consequently, higher status brokerage houses tend to be of larger size (Hong & 
Kubik, 2003). In fact, Hong,Kubik & Solomon (2000) classify brokerage house status according to size and 
confirm that larger brokerage houses enjoy higher status. In addition, Stickel (1995) provides evidence that 
capital market participants respond more to the buy and sell recommendations of analysts employed by 
large brokerage houses relative to other analysts; thus documenting the higher status and influence of large 
brokerage houses within financial markets. Heterogeneity in status across brokerage houses also points 
towards the presence of a Matthew effect in that investment recommendations by higher-status brokerage 
houses  are  likely  to  be  more  protected  for  infringing  norms  than  recommendations  by  lower-status 
brokerage  houses  (Podolny,  1993;  Rao,  1994;  Durand  et  al.,  2007).  Accordingly,  higher  status 
(equivalently, larger) brokerage houses are, on average, more likely to switch behaviour and conform to the 
emerging  stakeholder  focus.  Given  the  above  discussion,  we  follow  Hong  and  Kubik  (2003)  in 
approximating brokerage house status by the mean House Size constructed as the average number of 
analysts working at the focal brokerage house in any given year, and formulate the final hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Over time, analysts employed by larger brokerage houses are the first to become less 
pessimistic towards firms with high CSR scores. 
DATA, METHODS AND FINDINGS 17 
 
  We build our sample by combining several databases. We collect CSR scores from KLD, analysts’ 
recommendations from I/B/E/S, stock market data from CRSP and accounting data from COMPUSTAT. 
The resulting sample includes a total of 16,064 observations with available data for all variables for the 
period 1993 to 2007. Although the KLD database starts in 1992, we dropped data for the first year due to 
the lack of I/B/E/S data that are only available after 1992. The sample increases over time and by 2007 we 
have data for 2,311 US companies. Across all years, 3,580 unique companies are included in the sample. 
We  start  with  the  firms  in  the  KLD  dataset  and  drop  firms  for  one  of  three  reasons:  a)  analysts’ 
recommendations were not available or forecast errors could not be calculated based on data from I/B/E/S 
or b) stock market data were not available via CRSP or c) accounting data were not available through 
COMPUSTAT.  
  Analytically, the model that we estimate at the firm-year level of analysis is: 
meanrecit = β1 totstrit + β2 Xit+ β3Yit-1 + δ Zi +εit        (1) 
where, β1 is the coefficient of interest, Xit is a vector of control variables for firm i in year t including Total 
Relative CSR Concerns, Number of Analysts, Mean House Size, and Long-term Forecast Error; Yit-1 is a 
vector of (lagged) control variables for firm i in year t-1 including Market Value (size), Market Adjusted 
Returns,  Intangibles,  Return-on-Assets,  Earnings-to-Price-ratio,  Book-to-Market  Ratio  and  Capital 
Expenditure; and Zi is a vector of fixed effects to capture constant effects of firm and year. 
  We use the consensus (i.e. mean) investment recommendation (Mean Analysts’ Recommendation) 
for each firm i in the month of March of year t as the dependent variable of our empirical specifications 
(meanrecit). The I/B/E/S database records analysts’ investment recommendations on a five-point scale with 
1 indicating a “strong buy” recommendation and a 5 indicating a “sell” recommendation. We invert this 
scale so that more favorable recommendations take a higher value. This variable is constructed by I/B/E/S 
and reported in the consensus files. Essentially, for a given firm in the focal year, I/B/E/S first collects all 
published analyst recommendations (in our case, for the month of March) and then constructs an equally 
weighted average. Accordingly, for the focal firm in the focal year, our dependent variable is the average 18 
 
of all the investment recommendations published by the analysts that follow the firm. I/B/E/S reports 
consensus recommendations on the third Friday of each month and we select the March dataset in each year 
to ensure that analysts have had enough time to obtain and analyze the firm-level CSR scores. We fit panel 
data models that incorporate firm and year fixed effects exploiting within firm variation, and controlling 
for time-invariant unobservable firm attributes. 
 In recent years, CSR scores provided by KLD have been widely used in the academic literature 
(e.g. Graves & Waddock, 1994; Turban & Greening, 1997; Fisman, Heal, & Nair, 2005; Mattingly & 
Berman,  2006;  Godfrey,  Merrill,  &  Hansen,  2009)  and  have  in  fact  contributed  towards  the  high 
proliferation of CSR-related  articles (Margolis et al., 2007).9 In our work, we use the KLD STATS 
product.10 KLD provides CSR scores annually over the course of 15 years, making it an excellent data 
resource for exploring longitudinal CSR research questions. Researchers at KLD review the company’s 
public  documents,  including  the  annual  report,  the  company  website,  corporate  social  responsibility 
reporting, and other stakeholders’ and data sources. Company ratings represent a snapshot of the firm’s 
CSR profile at calendar year end. KLD researchers also monitor media sources for developing issues on a 
daily basis. The KLD STATS dataset is compiled around the beginning of every year (i.e. January) and it 
is typically available in spreadsheets for distribution at the latest by early February. As we mention above, 
to allow enough time for analysts to review these scores, we consider analyst recommendations for the 
month of March (i.e. the month after the release of the KLD scores).11. Their historical ratings data set is 
                                                           
9 Studies have shown that this dataset exhibits robust construct validity around its underlying measures (e.g., (Scharfman, 1996; 
Szwajkowski & Figlewicz, 1999; Mattingly & Berman, 2006)). More recently, however scholars have raised criticisms around 
aspects of the dataset. For example, (Chatterji, Levine, & Toffel, 2009) find “little evidence that KLD’s environmental strengths 
predicted any of the environmental outcomes” they analysed (p.162) although stating that “KLD environmental ratings do a 
reasonable job of aggregating past environmental performance” and that “the single KLD net environmental score (environmental 
strengths ratings minus environmental concerns ratings) and KLD’s total environmental concerns ratings helped predict future 
pollution levels, the value and number of subsequent regulatory penalties, and whether firms eventually reported any major spills 
(p.162). 
10 For a detailed description of the various screens and criteria included in KLD STATS the interested reader can have a look at  
KLD’s  website  at  (www.kld.com)  and  more  information  about  the  specific  database  product  we  use  at 
(http://www.kld.com/research/stats/index.html) 
11 In unreported results, and as a robustness check, we have also rerun our specifications using the April recommendations, allowing 
more time for the analysts to review the CSR scores, with virtually no changes in our findings. 19 
 
designed primarily as a binary system. For each strength (i.e. a positive screen) or concern (i.e. a negative 
screen) rating applied to a company, KLD includes a "1" indicating the presence of that screen/criterion 
and  a "0" indicating  its absence.  In  total,  six  issue  areas  are  included:  a)  Community,  b)  Corporate 
Governance, c) Diversity, d) Employee Relations, e) Product and f) Environmental Issues. 
  One issue faced by scholars that have used the KLD database in the past is how to construct a 
composite CSR measure. In other words, how to assign weights to the six issue areas covered in the 
database. Some articles have utilized differential category weights based on either (subjective) academic 
opinions about category importance (Graves & Waddock, 1994; Waddock & Graves, 1997) or have used 
the analytic hierarchy process to derive weights (Ruf, Muralidhar, & Paul, 1993). To date however, the 
literature has not identified a theoretically derived ranking of importance for the various stakeholder groups 
and issues to serve as a guide for empirical work. In fact, (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997) argue that finding 
such  a  universal  ranking  is  not  even  theoretically  possible.  In  this  paper,  we  follow  the  convention 
established by Waddock and Graves (1997) and Sharfman (1996), followed by Hillman & Keim (2001) 
and Waldman,Siegel & Javidan (2006) among many others, in developing a composite CSR score by 
assigning equal importance (and thus equal weights) to the different issue areas of the KLD database. In 
particular, Total CSR Strengths (totstrit) is the equally-weighted sum of KLD’s positive screens, classified 
as “strengths”, for firm i in year t adjusted by the mean of strengths averaged across all firms in the sample 
in year t to take into account firm entry into the KLD panel. In doing so, we also account for the trending 
of CSR ratings within our sample. 12  
Similarly, we construct Total CSR Concerns as a control variable, by deriving an equally-weighted 
sum of KLD’s negative screens, classified as “concerns” for each firm in each year of our sample. By 
distinguishing between CSR strengths and concerns, we follow several recent articles (e.g. Strike, Gao, & 
Bansal, 2006; Kacperczyk, 2009; Bear, Rahman, & Post, 2010) in arguing that CSR and CSiR (Corporate 
                                                           
12 We also used another specification, where we averaged across firms within the same industry in the same year with virtually no 
impact on our results. 20 
 
Social Irresponsibility) are two theoretically separate and distinct constructs and should be treated as such 
empirically. Indicatively, Godfrey et al. (2009) argue that the qualitative choice of engagement in CSR is 
distinct from incurring negative fines or penalties, which they label as “negative social impacts”. Whereas 
few prior articles have constructed a single CSR score by subtracting total concerns from total strengths 
(e.g. Slater & Dixon-Fowler, 2009; Manner, 2010), we do not adopt this approach in our empirical analysis 
because  the  theoretical  rationale  that  we  developed  pertains  specifically  to  the  strategic  choice  of 
corporations to engage in positive CSR (in order to meet stakeholder expectations) and how such policies 
are interpreted and evaluated by investment analysts. Equivalently, we consider such a single measure of 
CSR  to  be  problematic  since  it  is  merging  together  fundamentally  different  and  perhaps  conflicting 
underlying mechanisms: “doing good” is theoretically and strategically different from “doing no harm”. 
  We include several other control variables identified in prior literature as determinants of firm 
performance and/or influencing investment recommendations. Following a number of prior articles (e.g. 
Zuckerman, 1999) we control for the total number of analysts (Number of Analysts) who follow the firm in 
the focal year; similar to the case of critics in other markets (Shrum, 1996; Eliashberg & Shugan, 1997), 
the extent of analyst attention, as opposed to the specialization of their coverage, has been shown to affect 
firm value (Zuckerman, 1999). We obtain one recommendation per analyst per firm in the focal year 
therefore the number of analysts is the same as the number of investment recommendations for the focal 
firm in the focal year. The natural logarithm of Market Value of equity is a proxy for firm size and is also 
lagged by one year. Analysts might issue more favorable recommendations for larger firms since trading in 
these firms generates more trading commissions and these firms are more likely to generate investment 
banking business. The two revenues are the primary source of analyst compensation thereby incentivizing 
analysts to be more optimistic about these companies. Market-adjusted return is the one-year lagged stock 
return for the company over a fiscal year minus the stock return on the value-weighted index. We expect 
better performing stocks to have more positive recommendations reflecting the tendency of analysts to 
chase stock returns (Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische et al., 2004). Moreover, we include two control variables to 21 
 
account for analysts’ characteristics: a) Mean House Size calculated as the average number of employees 
for all the brokerage houses that employ an investment analyst who follows the focal firm, thus proxying 
for the availability of resources that the analyst has at her disposal to perform her research (Clement, 1999) 
and b) Long Term Forecast Error measuring the average long-term forecast error of the investment analysts 
that follow the focal firm and which captures the mean analyst ability in terms of how accurately they can 
predict a firm’s long-term performance (e.g. Mikhail, Walther, & Willis, 1997; Hong et al., 2000; Clement 
& Tse, 2005; Loh & Mian, 2006). We adopt the standard methodology in the literature whereby the long-
term forecast error is defined and calculated as the realized long-term growth in earnings minus the analysts' 
forecast of long-term growth in earnings. According to I/B/E/S, long-term growth forecasts are received 
directly from contributing analysts, and are not calculated by I/B/E/S. It generally represents an expected 
annual increase in operating earnings over the company’s next full business cycle. These forecasts typically 
refer to a period of between three to five years. 
We  also  include  several  time-varying  firm  characteristics  that  might  influence  analyst 
recommendations and that control for the performance implications of other strategic actions of the firm. 
First, we include two valuation ratios, (one-year lagged) earnings over price (Earnings-to-price ratio) and 
(one-year lagged) shareholder’s book value over market value of equity (Book-to-market ratio). We expect 
that all else equal, analysts will issue more favorable recommendations for firms with higher valuation 
ratios (Jegadeesh et al., 2004). Second, we include controls for the profitability of the firm measured as 
one-year lagged Return-on-assets (ROA), one-year lagged percentage of assets that are Intangibles, and 
Capital expenditures as percentage of total assets. The latter two variables identify firms that grow either 
by acquisitions or by investing in capital projects. We expect positive coefficients on all three variables 
(Jegadeesh et al., 2004). Finally, we estimate the model by including year and firm fixed effects (Zi). We 
cluster standard errors at the company level to mitigate serial correlation within a firm. We highlight here 
that the panel data design of our regression analysis coupled with the firm and year fixed effects, allows us 
to condition on the within-firm changes over time instead of the between-firm variation. This is particularly 22 
 
relevant and important for testing our theory where estimation of the coefficients of interest is based on 
longitudinal variation. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 panel A presents summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis. On average, a 
firm in our sample has one CSR strength. However, considerable variation exists since the sample includes 
firms with zero all the way to 15 CSR strengths; the standard deviation is approximately 1.5. The summary 
statistics also show that our sample includes mainly large firms who are followed by several analysts; on 
average there are about 11 investment recommendations per firm. Fourteen percent of the assets of the 
average company are intangibles and the average company is profitable (mean ROA=8.2%). Moreover, 
Table 1 panel B provides additional descriptive statistics pertaining to the analysts’ recommendations 
included in the sample. Specifically, the second column of the panel presents the average number of years 
of firm-specific experience that an analyst has in any given year. The rest of the columns report this average 
broken down by type of recommendation (whereby, 1 = “strong buy” and 5 = “strong sell”). We note an 
upward trend in the data due to the passing of time and thus, the accumulation of analyst experience, and 
also due to the increased number of unique firms covered in the sample across years. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
  Table 2 presents pair-wise correlations between the variables used in our empirical analysis. Total 
CSR Strengths is negatively correlated with Mean Analyst Recommendation, indicating that on average, 
across years and across firms, the analysts in our sample were unfavorable towards CSR ratings. In terms 
of our control variables, Firm size and Number of Analysts have a strong positive correlation with Total 
CSR Strengths as we would expect. Interestingly, the two controls for analyst ability, Mean House Size and 
Long-term  Forecast  Error,  are  significantly  negatively  correlated  with  our  dependent  variable.  Our 
theoretical  arguments  however,  are  longitudinal  in  nature,  and  therefore  the  subsequent  multivariate 
analysis directly tests our hypotheses. 23 
 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Results 
In table 3 panel B we present the main findings of estimating equation (1) on the full sample. In 
particular, the first column of table 3 panel B estimates this equation on the first bundle of years that includes 
observations for the period 1993-1996; each subsequent column adds an additional year to the data (i.e. the 
second  column  estimates equation  (1) for  the  period  1993-1997,  the third, 1993-1998  and  so  forth). 
Accordingly, the last column presents estimation results for equation (1) for the entire period 1993 – 2007 
covered in our sample. The independent variable of interest is Total CSR Strengths. We estimate the model 
on these different bundles of years to detect how the relation changes over time. Hypothesis 1 therefore 
predicts that the coefficient on Total CSR Strengths would initially be negative and increasingly less 
negative (or eventually positive). The estimates confirm this prediction. Graphically, figure 1 depicts the 
estimated coefficient on Total CSR Strengths and shows that as time goes by analysts’ reactions to CSR 
scores become increasingly less unfavorable, and eventually become favorable. 
It is important to note that the number of unique firms increases across the columns of table 3 panel 
B because KLD progressively expanded their coverage over our sample period. However, it is unlikely that 
these changes would affect the findings since the specifications include firm fixed effects, and therefore the 
coefficients  are  estimated  from  within  firm  variance  over  time  rather  than  cross-sectional  variation. 
Nevertheless, we proceed to construct a relatively more balanced panel by limiting our sample to only 
include firms that were present for at least 10 years of the sample period (i.e. two thirds of the time) – 
obtaining 295 firms for 1993-1996, and ranging from 318 to 356 for the remaining time periods. We report 
these findings as table 3 panel A, and since the estimates are qualitatively similar between panel A and 
panel B, we consider panel A as our main results.  
Moreover, we note that as expected, in the last couple of columns of table 3, panel A the coefficient 
on Total CSR Strengths becomes statistically insignificant. The insignificance emerges because over time, 24 
 
the underlying pooled data confounds the shifting perception of CSR scores by investment analysts; this 
particularly applies for the columns where we pool data for the entire period 1993-2007 covered in our 
sample. Finally, we note that the coefficient on Total CSR Concerns remains predominantly insignificant 
across specifications, and does not follow any discernible pattern over time. This implies, as we suggest in 
our theoretical development section, that the shifting institutional logic from an agency to a stakeholder 
perspective is much more likely to affect pro-active CSR initiatives that are undertaken to meet the needs 
and expectations of a wider range of stakeholder and are therefore perceived as potentially mitigating risks 
or even generating firm value. On the other hand, investment analysts would unfavorably assess CSR 
shortfalls and failures, whether these are perceived as an agency cost or as value-destructing activities. The 
directionality of this argument appears to be supported in table 3 panel B: whenever statistically significant, 
the coefficient on Total CSR Concerns is in fact negative. 
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 
--------------------------------------- 
 
  Hypothesis 2 argues that more experienced analysts are more likely to be the first to switch from 
unfavorable to favorable evaluations of firms with high CSR scores. Based on the full sample, we calculate 
analyst experience as the total number of years that the focal analyst has followed the focal firm. Panel A 
of table 4 replicates the models of table 3 (panel B) but confines the sample to the top two quartiles of 
analyst experience whereas Panel B confines the sample to the bottom two quartiles of analyst experience. 
Confirming hypothesis 2, the estimated coefficients indicate that the more experienced analysts issue more 
favorable recommendations (equivalently, less unfavorable) over time and by the end of our sample period 
(last three columns of table  4, panel A) their evaluations of firms with high CSR strengths become 
significantly positive. In contrast, for the bottom two quartiles of analyst experience, assessment of CSR 
scores remains unfavorable for the entire 1993 – 2007 period, although the estimated coefficient does 
become somewhat less unfavorable over time. Graphically, figure 2 plots the estimated coefficients for the 
top two and the bottom two quartiles of analyst experience, and shows that not only do the more experienced 25 
 
analysts  switch  first  to  favorable  recommendations  but  also,  that  they  more  rapidly  adjust  their 
recommendations (i.e. the curve for the top two quartiles appears steeper than the one for the bottom two 
quartiles of analyst experience). Similarly, table 5 tests hypothesis 3 according to which analysts employed 
by  larger  brokerage  houses  are  more  likely  to  be  the  first  to  switch  from  unfavorable  to  favorable 
evaluations of firms with high CSR scores. Accordingly, panels A and B replicate the models of table 3 but 
this  time  the  sample  is  confined  to  the  top  two  and  bottom  two  quartiles  of  the  mean  House  Size, 
respectively. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that analysts employed by larger brokerage houses 
are more likely to switch to favorable evaluations of firms with high CSR scores, over time. 
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
 
Alternative Explanation: Learning by Analysts 
A plausible alternative explanation for the findings presented here is that, over time, analysts learn 
to evaluate CSR ratings by better understanding how CSR may contribute towards risk mitigation or value 
creation. If this were indeed the case, analysts would be relatively pessimistic about the future profitability 
of firms with high CSR scores and relatively optimistic about the future profitability of firms with low CSR 
scores during the early periods of our sample. This underlying learning argument then, may plausibly 
generate the pattern that we observe in the findings without the need to account for a potential shift in the 
prevailing  institutional  logic  (thus,  generating  a  spurious  correlation  in  table  3).  A  plethora  of  both 
theoretical and empirical articles (e.g. Mikhail et al., 1997; Hong et al., 2000; Clement & Tse, 2005; Loh 
& Mian, 2006) model analysts’ learning using Analyst Forecast Error; we follow this tradition here as well. 
The main idea behind this metric is that if analysts are learning how to better evaluate a focal CSR policy 
over time, then their earnings forecasts will increasingly become more accurate. In other words, we would 
expect CSR scores to be significantly associated with forecast errors in the initial period of our sample and, 
as analysts learn, we expect this significant association to diminish and eventually be eliminated. Panel A 
of table 6 replicates the specifications of table 3 but uses Analyst Forecast Error as the dependent variable. 26 
 
Because forecast errors increase with forecast horizon, we introduce a control variable for horizon in our 
specifications as well. We find no statistically significant association between CSR scores and forecast error 
for any specification across the two tables, suggesting that for the context and time period of our sample, 
learning by analysts does not appear to be an alternative explanation for the estimated empirical pattern of 
table 3. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
-------------------------------- 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
  We explore the sociological processes that affect the evaluation of firms with high CSR scores by 
sell-side investment analysts in the US, over a period of 15 years. We argue and find empirical evidence 
that a weakening of the prevailing logic – the agency logic – and the gradual emergence of a stakeholder 
focus, leads to an initial unfavorable and a subsequent more favorable evaluation of firms with high CSR 
scores by investment analysts. Whereas under an agency logic CSR was typically interpreted as an activity 
that primarily generated managerial returns or satisfied managerial aspirations to the detriment of corporate 
profitability (i.e. an agency cost), under a stakeholder logic, CSR is conceptualized as a set of corporate 
policies essential to corporate standing that does not penalize a firm’s financial performance and may even 
generate financial value in the long-run. Our article provides insights into the assessment of firms with high 
CSR ratings, and suggests that firms may adopt CSR without being penalized by a key third party in the 
financial markets, namely sell-side analysts.  
  As mentioned at the outset of this article, an emerging strand of literature has focused on the 
relationship between CSR and financial markets but without explicitly taking into account the sociological 
processes that affect the assessment of firms’ CSR ratings. According to extensive prior literature, in 
financial markets such sociological processes have a direct and measurable impact on firm value (Phillips 
& Zuckerman, 2001; Zajac & Westphal, 2004) making this an important gap that needs to be addressed. 
Such sociological processes are particularly relevant for the domain of CSR where stakeholder expectations 27 
 
and external assessments by third parties are especially salient. With this paper we begin to fill this gap in 
our understanding by introducing the idea that the prevailing agency logic was weakened by the gradual 
emergence of a stakeholder orientation within the analyst and investor community.  
  The findings of this article also provide support to the institutional perspective that focuses on how 
financial markets perceive and assess policies such as those related to CSR. The theoretical arguments, as 
well as the empirical evidence presented here provide additional support for the influence of historical 
change on the dominant belief system or institutional logic of key market actors. Furthermore, we are able 
to provide evidence that market actors who possess more experience or enjoy higher status are more likely 
to be the first to adjust their assessments based on this new and emergent logic. We therefore contribute to 
the sociological research that focuses on understanding the macro-historical and institutional changes in the 
context, to the literature that focuses on the micro-social dynamics of financial markets (Abolafia, 1996; 
Westphal & Zajac, 1998; Zuckerman, 1999) and to the more recent literature exploring the inputs to the 
social estimation process that drives stock market valuation (Zajac & Westphal, 2004). 
  Our work also closely relates to a recent stream of work in management (Benner, 2007, 2010; 
Benner & Ranganathan, 2012) that explores the reactions of investment analysts to the adoption of specific 
firm strategies during times of radical technological change. In fact, these articles find that such reactions 
exert pressures on firms and significantly affect their subsequent adoption of strategies. Given that in this 
article we find an increasingly less unfavorable assessment of CSR ratings by analysts, especially by those 
of higher experience and higher status, exploring how this shift in institutional logics will affect the 
subsequent adoption of CSR by firms becomes an interesting avenue of future research. It would also be 
important to understand the specific mechanisms through which such pressures are exerted on firms and 
which firms are more likely to respond to them and in what ways. For example, some firms may increasingly 
engage in CSR by ceremonially conforming to such pressures – in the form of symbolic actions – whereas 
others may realize the value-creating potential and accordingly adopt a range of substantive CSR actions.  28 
 
Whereas most of the prior work on social construction of capital markets (Zuckerman, 1999; Zajac 
&  Westphal,  2004)  has  focused  on  issues  of  governance  (e.g.  stock  repurchase  plans,  or  incentives 
provision), our work here broadens the theoretical scope of social construction theory to argue that in 
addition  to  governance  issues,  social  construction  may  intrinsically  affect  analysts’  perceptions  and 
evaluations of social and environmental initiatives adopted by companies.  Similarly, whereas the strategy 
literature to date has explored analysts’ reactions to predominantly financial metrics or radical technological 
innovations, our article expands the scope of this literature as well, by exploring the impact of non-financial 
metrics on investment recommendations. Therefore, since CSR is considered as a set of policies adopted 
by corporations to meet the needs and expectations of multiple stakeholders, our study is essentially 
exploring how a shifting logic affects the perception and evaluation of firms’ actions aimed at numerous 
and diverse stakeholders by a key social actor in the capital markets, namely sell-side analysts. Relatedly, 
we  note  that  a  fruitful  avenue  of  future  research  is  to  develop  more  nuanced  theory  and  a  deeper 
understanding of the changing perceptions of analysts with regards to each of these stakeholders, as opposed 
to exploring CSR as one multi-dimensional construct. 
Finally, whereas in the existing finance literature herding behavior has typically been linked to 
financial metrics (or, equivalently, instrumental outcomes), in this article we suggest that herding behavior 
may also extend to domains beyond the financial, to include environmental, social and broader CSR issues. 
Moreover, by exploring the heterogeneity across analysts and across brokerage houses, our article develops 
a more nuanced understanding of how a shifting institutional logic affects different analysts and brokerage 
houses differentially. Thus, to the best of our knowledge, our study is the first one to integrate across the 
CSR and herding and finance literatures to shed new light on a phenomenon that is increasingly gaining 
momentum in capital markets.  
Limitations and Future Research  
Despite its contributions, this article is not without its limitations; here, we highlight a few. The first, relates 
to the potentially changing nature of the underlying policies captured by our CSR measures. If these policies 29 
 
are themselves changing then the observed shift in sell-side analysts’ recommendations can be partly 
attributed to such a change rather than the claimed change in the institutional logic. However, we consider 
this to be rather unlikely given that the policies included in our CSR measures remain stable over time. For 
example, diversity in the workforce, recycling of materials, and community engagement were captured and 
quantified in the same way throughout our sample period. Moreover, there were no redefinitions of the 
underlying constructs used in our analysis during our sample period. The second caveat relates to the 
changing characteristics of the sell-side analyst profession itself. If sell-side analysts exhibit fundamentally 
different individual characteristics over time, in terms of gender, educational background, social class, to 
name a few, then these changing attributes could partly explain the changing assessment of CSR scores. 
However,  prior  work  that  has  explored  ties  formed  across  analysts  based  on  common  educational 
backgrounds Cohen et al. (2010) does not appear to detect or argue for any such shifts over this time period 
within the analyst profession. Undoubtedly, the ideal empirical test would have been to use a sample of 
investment recommendations from a fixed set of sell-side analysts whom we would be able to follow for 
over 15 years and who would issue recommendations for the same firms. However, such long tenures are 
relatively rare and unusual within the sell-side analyst profession precluding us from being able to conduct 
this type of analysis. Thus, by not including analyst fixed effects, our current analysis derives estimates not 
from within-analyst variation, but rather from within-firm variation over time (since we include instead 
firm fixed effects). Nevertheless, we are unaware of any other existing evidence that the employee base of 
the sell-side analyst profession has changed systematically over the time period we study, thus making it 
less likely that this issue could affect  our findings. Similarly, we cannot include fixed effects at the 
brokerage house level; instead, we include a control variable for mean house size across the analysts that 
follow a focal firm in each year. Therefore, a potential systematic change in ideology or house culture 
attributed to the institutional logic shift affecting the brokerage houses that follow a focal firm during the 
years of our analysis, may introduce a bias in our findings. However, to the extent that this potential bias is 30 
 
idiosyncratic to a focal firm and the brokerage houses that follow it, then this issue is accounted for by our 
inclusion of firm fixed effects. 
The weakening of the previously dominant agency logic that we document here appears to have 
been taking place in the US over a 15-year horizon. A fruitful avenue for future research would be to 
investigate how this change in institutional logic affected the speed with which the interpretation and 
assessment of CSR changed by sell-side analysts in other countries. We know, for example, that some 
countries, including Sweden, France, the UK, Canada, and South Africa have instituted more progressive 
policies favoring the adoption of CSR by companies, potentially accelerating the institutional logic shift. 
Accordingly, future work may seek to understand the institutional processes and characteristics that affect 
the speed of change in assessment for the CSR context in particular, but also more broadly.  In our article 
we document positive but relatively small associations between investment recommendations and CSR 
strengths in more recent years. Therefore, subsequent articles may explore the conditions and the extent to 
which analysts reward proactive CSR with even more favorable recommendations. It could be that in other 
countries or under different conditions, analysts reward firms with high CSR strengths with larger increases 
in investment recommendation optimism, indicating perhaps more salient and prevalent institutional logics. 
Relatedly, future research could explore whether, to what extent and why specific CSR dimensions and 
policies are more or less likely to be associated with favorable analysts’ recommendations. This issue also 
links to the work by Delmas, Etzion & Narn-Birch (2013) who suggest that composite measures might be 
misrepresentative  of  the  underlying  process  and  outcome  dimensions  of  environmental  (or  social) 
performance.  Accordingly,  in  unreported  analysis,  rather  than  using  a  composite  CSR  score  as  our 
dependent variable, we used separate variables corresponding to the KLD categories associated with a) 
Community, b) Corporate Governance, c) Diversity, d) Employee Relations, and e) Environmental f) 
Product issues to estimate the main specifications of table 3. Keeping in mind the lack of theoretical 
guidance regarding  the relative  weight  and  importance  of  specific  CSR  dimensions,  this  preliminary 
empirical investigation finds that a) environmental issues are beginning to be perceived more positively in 31 
 
recent years by analysts, perhaps indicating their value creating potential and b) issues of diversity (or 
broader social issues) are beginning to be perceived less negatively, perhaps reflecting their risk mitigation 
potential. To further explore this issue for our sample, we reproduced the specifications of table 6 using 
these six KLD categories rather than the composite CSR score as our independent variables, and we did not 
detect any differential learning by analysts (i.e. no significant correlation with forecast errors) across issue 
areas.  Without a doubt, both theoretically as well as empirically, a lot more needs to be done in the future 
to understand the more nuanced mechanisms at work regarding how CSR categories and policies are 
perceived and evaluated by analysts as well as other social actors within public equity markets.  
Moreover, we note that although we argue for the broader weakening of the agency logic, we do 
not argue for the complete emergence of an alternative logic (i.e. a complete paradigm shift). In this sense, 
we are not able to detect a threshold of adoption effect (Delmas & Montes-Sancho, 2011) because arguably 
in the relation between CSR perceptions and financial markets, this threshold has not yet materialized. 
Undoubtedly though, this is another avenue for follow up research.  
Finally, as we discuss in our hypotheses development section, a myriad of factors contributed to 
the weakening of the agency logic including mandatory and voluntary reporting, NGO activity, academic 
research,  increasing  consumer  awareness,  proactive  corporate  leadership,  and  socially  responsible 
investments. Future research could try to determine which of these elements were particularly influential in 
this shift and through which specific mechanisms. It could be that a combination of these factors was 
necessary and sufficient for a change in institutional logic; or that all of them combined generated the effects 
we document here. Future research may also explore whether a tipping point may emerge that would 
eventually led to the replacement of the agency logic by the stakeholder logic. Understanding this process 
is particularly important at a time when even the public debate focuses on redefining the role of the 
corporation in society and an era in which new systems of resource allocation in the global economy – such 
as Sustainable Capitalism suggested by Generation investment co-founders Al Gore and David Blood – are 
slowly but steadily gaining traction around the world. 32 
 
Table 1 Panel A: Summary statistics (16,064 obs.) 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
         
Mean Analyst Recommendation  3.652  0.520  1.000  5.000 
          
Total CSR Strengths  1.055  1.481  0.000  15.705 
          
Total CSR Concerns  1.014  1.079  0.000  12.405 
Number of Analysts  10.707  7.067  1.000  47.000 
Mean House Size  64.047  36.638  1.000  353.000 
Long-Term Forecast Error  0.005  0.033  -0.446  0.500 
Market Value (Size)  14.476  1.467  11.302  19.325 
Market Adjusted Return  0.037  0.402  -0.860  3.207 
Intangibles  0.139  0.175  0.000  0.767 
Return on assets  0.082  0.111  -0.573  0.416 
Earnings-to-price ratio  0.029  0.093  -1.537  0.197 
Book-to-market ratio  0.438  0.281  -0.254  3.201 
Capital Expenditure  0.049  0.054  0.000  0.355 
 
Table 1 Panel B:  
Average years of firm-specific analyst experience by year and type of recommendation (16,064 obs.) 
Year  Average #  Type of Recommendation 
 
of years of firm-
specific exp.  1  2  3  4  5 
1993  1.43  1.49  1.46  1.40  1.38  1.52 
1994  1.79  2.13  1.78  1.75  1.80  1.77 
1995  2.05  2.43  1.84  2.03  2.06  2.07 
1996  2.21  2.73  2.42  2.29  2.16  2.10 
1997  2.24  2.27  2.38  2.26  2.25  2.19 
1998  2.35  2.22  3.02  2.41  2.36  2.25 
1999  2.45  2.50  2.93  2.49  2.45  2.40 
2000  2.40  2.95  2.47  2.35  2.39  2.48 
2001  2.34  2.32  2.40  2.27  2.41  2.35 
2002  2.48  2.47  2.73  2.49  2.49  2.32 
2003  2.39  2.51  2.75  2.45  2.34  2.21 
2004  2.42  2.75  2.70  2.43  2.34  2.35 
2005  2.45  2.61  2.68  2.51  2.43  2.23 
2006  2.49  2.77  2.84  2.53  2.40  2.37 
2007  2.48  2.74  2.53  2.47  2.28  2.66 
 33 
 
Table 2: Pairwise correlation coefficients with significance level (16,064 obs.) 
      (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
1  Mean Analyst Recommendation  1.000                       
                             
2  Total CSR Strengths  -0.043  1.000                     
     0.000                       
3  Total CSR Concerns  -0.040  0.370  1.000                   
      0.000  0.000                     
4  Number of Analysts  0.017  0.338  0.286  1.000                 
      0.030  0.000  0.000                   
5  Mean House Size  -0.050  0.091  0.145  0.206  1.000               
      0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000                 
6  Long-term Forecast Error  -0.048  -0.017  -0.013  -0.068  -0.015  1.000             
      0.000  0.028  0.091  0.000  0.064               
7  Market Value (Size)  0.051  0.454  0.442  0.731  0.359  -0.086  1.000           
      0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000             
8  Market Adjusted Return  0.172  -0.025  0.005  -0.024  0.028  -0.124  0.056  1.000         
      0.000  0.001  0.512  0.003  0.000  0.000  0.000           
9  Intangibles  0.056  -0.029  0.007  -0.009  0.056  0.001  0.013  -0.045  1.000       
      0.000  0.000  0.355  0.274  0.000  0.910  0.097  0.000         
10  Return on assets  0.075  0.068  0.021  0.145  0.089  -0.088  0.281  0.102  0.086  1.000     
      0.000  0.000  0.008  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000       
11  Earnings-to-price ratio  0.061  0.035  0.013  0.030  0.028  -0.161  0.166  0.093  -0.040  0.450  1.000   
      0.000  0.000  0.097  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000     
12  Book-to-market ratio  -0.213  -0.077  -0.003  -0.184  0.009  0.198  -0.221  -0.180  -0.012  -0.217  -0.014  1.000 
      0.000  0.000  0.756  0.000  0.262  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.125  0.000  0.076   
13  Capital Expenditure  0.089  -0.032  0.024  0.120  0.008  -0.003  0.036  0.006  -0.177  0.164  0.009  -0.104 
      0.000  0.000  0.002  0.000  0.301  0.740  0.000  0.479  0.000  0.000  0.277  0.000 34 
 
Table 3 – Panel A: OLS regression analysis - Impact on mean analysts’ recommendations, adding years (Balanced Sample) 
   Time Period 
   1993-96  1993-97  1993-98  1993-99  1993-00  1993-01  1993-02  1993-03  1993-04  1993-05  1993-06  1993-07 
Dependent Variable  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec 
Total CSR Strengths  -0.074***  -0.064***  -0.050**  -0.038**  -0.033*  -0.016  -0.016  0.001  0.005  0.001  0.002  0.002 
   (0.026)  (0.024)  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.007) 
Total CSR Concerns  -0.023  -0.019  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  0.004  0.004  0.001  -0.005  -0.004  -0.002  -0.001 
   (0.020)  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.009) 
Number of Analysts  0.001  -0.003  -0.001  -0.000  -0.004  -0.005*  -0.006**  -0.005*  -0.004*  -0.005**  -0.005**  -0.006** 
   (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Mean House size  -0.000  -0.001  0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000*  -0.001**  -0.001**  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001*** 
   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Long Term Forecast Error  0.016  -0.569  -0.445  -0.527  0.162  0.719*  -0.020  -0.196  -0.228  -0.035  -0.022  -0.150 
   (1.338)  (1.337)  (0.932)  (0.635)  (0.498)  (0.432)  (0.557)  (0.583)  (0.541)  (0.526)  (0.418)  (0.424) 
Market Value (Size)  0.303***  0.265***  0.143***  0.064*  0.097***  0.117***  0.128***  0.121***  0.113***  0.109***  0.115***  0.121*** 
   (0.082)  (0.060)  (0.047)  (0.038)  (0.035)  (0.033)  (0.031)  (0.029)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.025) 
Market Adjusted Return  0.136***  0.142***  0.139***  0.100***  0.142***  0.145***  0.158***  0.181***  0.187***  0.178***  0.172***  0.180*** 
   (0.043)  (0.034)  (0.031)  (0.021)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
Intangibles  0.143  0.085  0.230  0.256  0.183  0.166  0.251**  0.280**  0.244*  0.279**  0.286**  0.340*** 
   (0.289)  (0.205)  (0.172)  (0.160)  (0.150)  (0.134)  (0.123)  (0.127)  (0.126)  (0.122)  (0.114)  (0.108) 
Return on Assets  0.436  0.451  0.633*  0.878**  1.245***  1.002***  0.845***  0.654***  0.528**  0.528**  0.507**  0.430** 
   (0.474)  (0.413)  (0.349)  (0.341)  (0.295)  (0.255)  (0.239)  (0.240)  (0.233)  (0.225)  (0.219)  (0.206) 
Earnings-to-price ratio  0.076  0.079  -0.017  0.172  -0.267  -0.284*  -0.053  0.065  0.155  0.151  0.227**  0.166* 
   (0.337)  (0.292)  (0.257)  (0.232)  (0.174)  (0.149)  (0.107)  (0.106)  (0.109)  (0.105)  (0.111)  (0.088) 
Book-to-Market ratio  -0.474***  -0.427***  -0.550***  -0.655***  -0.363***  -0.338***  -0.310***  -0.321***  -0.325***  -0.331***  -0.332***  -0.340*** 
   (0.146)  (0.116)  (0.095)  (0.083)  (0.055)  (0.052)  (0.051)  (0.052)  (0.049)  (0.047)  (0.046)  (0.045) 
Capital Expenditure  0.105  0.325  0.327  0.283  0.376  0.577*  0.481  0.497*  0.457  0.348  0.381  0.592** 
   (0.623)  (0.514)  (0.440)  (0.358)  (0.352)  (0.333)  (0.328)  (0.294)  (0.290)  (0.303)  (0.290)  (0.295) 
                          
Constant  -0.634  -0.154  1.714**  2.877***  2.379***  2.004***  1.847***  1.687***  1.816***  2.164***  1.779***  1.997*** 
   (1.207)  (0.915)  (0.705)  (0.572)  (0.539)  (0.486)  (0.478)  (0.449)  (0.426)  (0.396)  (0.422)  (0.374) 
                          
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
                          
Observations  1,065  1,374  1,714  2,054  2,382  2,727  3,065  3,404  3,737  4,056  4,361  4,644 
R-squared  0.170  0.166  0.171  0.258  0.251  0.227  0.304  0.302  0.296  0.279  0.276  0.273 
Number of Unique Firms  295  318  352  354  355  355  355  355  356  356  356  356 
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Table 3 – Panel B: OLS regression analysis - Impact on mean analysts’ recommendations, adding years (Full Sample) 
   Time Period 
   1993-96  1993-97  1993-98  1993-99  1993-00  1993-01  1993-02  1993-03  1993-04  1993-05  1993-06  1993-07 
Dependent Variable  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec 
Total CSR Strengths  -0.083***  -0.078***  -0.065***  -0.051***  -0.044***  -0.027**  -0.026**  0.001  0.002  0.004  0.005  0.004 
   0.022  0.021  0.018  0.017  0.016  0.013  0.013  0.009  0.008  0.007  0.006  0.006 
Total CSR Concerns  -0.004  -0.004  0.002  0.001  0.003  0.007  0.005  0.001  -0.011  -0.013*  -0.012*  -0.010 
   0.018  0.015  0.014  0.013  0.012  0.011  0.011  0.010  0.008  0.007  0.007  0.007 
Number of Analysts  0.002  -0.001  0.001  0.001  -0.003  -0.004*  -0.006***  -0.005**  -0.005***  -0.007***  -0.006***  -0.008*** 
   0.005  0.004  0.003  0.003  0.003  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.001 
Mean House size  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.000*  -0.000**  -0.000*  -0.000**  -0.000***  -0.000*** 
   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Long Term Forecast Error  -0.224  -0.089  0.431  0.330  0.441  0.762**  0.340  0.405  0.138  -0.029  -0.022  -0.017 
   0.789  0.767  0.658  0.605  0.388  0.349  0.331  0.308  0.227  0.199  0.155  0.139 
Market Value (Size)  0.320***  0.239***  0.121***  0.048  0.091***  0.113***  0.152***  0.162***  0.167***  0.153***  0.163***  0.152*** 
   0.066  0.052  0.043  0.035  0.031  0.030  0.027  0.024  0.022  0.020  0.018  0.016 
Market Adjusted Return  0.176***  0.184***  0.183***  0.131***  0.153***  0.156***  0.164***  0.164***  0.146***  0.119***  0.108***  0.111*** 
   0.037  0.032  0.029  0.021  0.017  0.016  0.015  0.016  0.013  0.012  0.011  0.010 
Intangibles  0.128  0.192  0.238  0.265*  0.168  0.097  0.101  0.157  0.199**  0.186**  0.147**  0.212*** 
   0.227  0.173  0.152  0.141  0.133  0.122  0.104  0.100  0.090  0.081  0.073  0.065 
Return on Assets  0.455  0.505  0.608**  0.933***  1.152***  0.850***  0.497***  0.380**  0.397***  0.377***  0.271**  0.282*** 
   0.370  0.326  0.280  0.284  0.241  0.205  0.173  0.166  0.138  0.120  0.108  0.103 
Earnings-to-price ratio  0.142  0.160  0.041  0.066  -0.206  -0.191  0.123  0.129**  0.152**  0.168***  0.239***  0.195*** 
   0.188  0.180  0.166  0.155  0.133  0.117  0.079  0.065  0.060  0.059  0.059  0.046 
Book-to-Market ratio  -0.431***  -0.439***  -0.546***  -0.644***  -0.391***  -0.378***  -0.313***  -0.310***  -0.308***  -0.348***  -0.337***  -0.357*** 
   0.106  0.093  0.081  0.073  0.051  0.048  0.043  0.041  0.037  0.036  0.033  0.029 
Capital Expenditure  -0.117  0.246  0.231  0.310  0.327  0.485*  0.488*  0.364  0.327  0.234  0.310  0.262 
   0.477  0.407  0.361  0.310  0.301  0.282  0.270  0.245  0.224  0.209  0.191  0.173 
Constant  -0.929  0.313  2.070***  3.380***  2.389***  2.122***  1.629***  1.185***  1.514***  1.777***  1.661***  1.846*** 
   0.982  0.767  0.657  0.544  0.460  0.436  0.410  0.365  0.302  0.286  0.249  0.224 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1,467  1,855  2,260  2,682  3,132  3,982  4,871  6,967  9,194  11,496  13,753  16,064 
R-squared  0.189  0.174  0.176  0.246  0.247  0.235  0.351  0.331  0.274  0.224  0.2  0.181 
Number of Unique Firms  427  460  509  560  617  1,014  1,149  2,320  2,725  3,040  3,291  3,580 
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Table 4, Panel A: OLS regression analysis - Impact on mean analysts’ recommendations for top two quartiles of analyst experience 
   Time Period 
   1993-96  1993-97  1993-98  1993-99  1993-00  1993-01  1993-02  1993-03  1993-04  1993-05  1993-06  1993-07 
Dependent Variable  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec 
Total CSR Strengths  -0.071***  -0.067***  -0.055***  -0.047***  -0.040**  -0.017  -0.012  0.011  0.013  0.015**  0.015**  0.014** 
   0.024  0.022  0.019  0.018  0.016  0.013  0.013  0.009  0.008  0.007  0.006  0.006 
Total CSR Concerns  -0.029  -0.018  -0.011  -0.012  -0.010  -0.005  -0.003  -0.003  -0.015*  -0.017**  -0.016**  -0.017** 
   0.020  0.017  0.015  0.014  0.013  0.011  0.012  0.010  0.009  0.008  0.007  0.007 
Number of Analysts  0.005  0.000  0.001  -0.001  -0.004  -0.005**  -0.008***  -0.005**  -0.005**  -0.006***  -0.006***  -0.007*** 
   0.005  0.004  0.004  0.003  0.003  0.003  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002 
Mean House size  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.000*  0.000  -0.000*  -0.000*  -0.000**  -0.000***  -0.000*** 
   0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Long Term Forecast Error  1.006  0.171  0.603  0.223  0.358  0.847**  0.272  0.336  0.284  0.024  -0.006  0.028 
   1.318  1.063  0.777  0.794  0.384  0.350  0.354  0.328  0.241  0.215  0.170  0.155 
Market Value (Size)  0.378***  0.279***  0.134***  0.069*  0.114***  0.136***  0.177***  0.184***  0.178***  0.163***  0.172***  0.159*** 
   0.070  0.055  0.045  0.037  0.034  0.032  0.028  0.025  0.023  0.022  0.020  0.018 
Market Adjusted Return  0.150***  0.175***  0.175***  0.124***  0.156***  0.157***  0.164***  0.160***  0.145***  0.121***  0.112***  0.116*** 
   0.042  0.036  0.033  0.023  0.018  0.018  0.016  0.016  0.014  0.012  0.012  0.012 
Intangibles  0.056  0.186  0.309*  0.333**  0.260*  0.161  0.117  0.163  0.217**  0.250***  0.212**  0.272*** 
   0.263  0.186  0.170  0.161  0.149  0.137  0.113  0.109  0.100  0.089  0.083  0.078 
Return on Assets  0.126  0.255  0.447  0.630**  0.967***  0.673***  0.297*  0.175  0.204  0.244*  0.221*  0.204* 
   0.431  0.366  0.288  0.280  0.238  0.209  0.172  0.165  0.145  0.132  0.123  0.113 
Earnings-to-price ratio  -0.086  -0.052  -0.068  0.095  -0.159  -0.136  0.142*  0.147**  0.188***  0.183***  0.250***  0.200*** 
   0.309  0.254  0.225  0.204  0.162  0.139  0.082  0.069  0.062  0.060  0.063  0.051 
Book-to-Market ratio  -0.531***  -0.556***  -0.626***  -0.691***  -0.375***  -0.379***  -0.309***  -0.311***  -0.309***  -0.339***  -0.331***  -0.349*** 
   0.132  0.108  0.087  0.078  0.055  0.052  0.039  0.037  0.036  0.036  0.034  0.031 
Capital Expenditure  -0.206  0.149  0.269  0.317  0.418  0.505  0.561*  0.505*  0.290  0.215  0.296  0.345* 
   0.641  0.495  0.432  0.371  0.356  0.321  0.306  0.266  0.242  0.233  0.209  0.195 
Constant  -1.776*  -0.389  1.890***  2.881***  2.140***  1.838***  1.235***  0.809**  1.351***  1.191***  1.486***  1.655*** 
   1.043  0.850  0.686  0.556  0.534  0.479  0.429  0.374  0.323  0.330  0.287  0.260 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1,034  1,336  1,669  2,032  2,420  3,133  3,896  5,393  6,861  8,304  9,673  10,998 
R-squared  0.22  0.209  0.202  0.276  0.273  0.261  0.395  0.372  0.319  0.272  0.25  0.228 
Number of Unique Firms  289  310  352  398  445  768  877  1,583  1,711  1,809  1,866  1,932 
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Table 4, Panel B: OLS regression analysis - Impact on mean analysts’ recommendations for bottom two quartiles of analyst experience 
   Time Period 
   1993-96  1993-97  1993-98  1993-99  1993-00  1993-01  1993-02  1993-03  1993-04  1993-05  1993-06  1993-07 
Dependent Variable  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec 
Total CSR Strengths  -0.100**  -0.119**  -0.100*  -0.060  -0.053  -0.060  -0.080**  -0.043  -0.051*  -0.045**  -0.034*  -0.036** 
   0.050  0.052  0.053  0.051  0.050  0.041  0.040  0.031  0.029  0.022  0.018  0.017 
Total CSR Concerns  0.068*  0.046  0.056  0.060*  0.065**  0.075**  0.062*  0.047  0.027  0.020  0.021  0.032* 
   0.036  0.033  0.035  0.035  0.032  0.029  0.034  0.032  0.026  0.021  0.020  0.018 
Number of Analysts  -0.001  0.000  0.001  0.003  0.000  0.000  -0.004  -0.007  -0.010**  -0.013***  -0.009**  -0.011*** 
   0.010  0.009  0.008  0.008  0.007  0.006  0.005  0.005  0.005  0.004  0.004  0.003 
Mean House size  -0.001  -0.001**  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
   0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Long Term Forecast Error  -0.619  -0.377  0.131  0.251  0.520  0.561  0.567  0.698  -0.248  -0.145  -0.033  -0.078 
   1.004  1.051  1.017  0.975  0.840  0.798  0.783  0.781  0.533  0.457  0.352  0.271 
Market Value (Size)  0.227  0.140  0.085  -0.005  0.041  0.068  0.108*  0.131**  0.197***  0.179***  0.175***  0.166*** 
   0.156  0.133  0.110  0.077  0.064  0.060  0.064  0.064  0.056  0.046  0.039  0.033 
Market Adjusted Return  0.250***  0.216***  0.210***  0.159***  0.135***  0.153***  0.158***  0.177***  0.147***  0.116***  0.103***  0.103*** 
   0.077  0.069  0.066  0.058  0.044  0.041  0.041  0.049  0.034  0.029  0.023  0.021 
Intangibles  0.044  0.080  -0.006  -0.030  -0.200  -0.167  0.063  0.227  0.147  -0.013  -0.049  0.054 
   0.384  0.392  0.328  0.307  0.298  0.265  0.248  0.213  0.191  0.171  0.144  0.114 
Return on Assets  1.115  1.160*  1.177  1.954***  1.789***  1.537***  1.375***  1.293***  1.141***  0.811***  0.426*  0.418** 
   0.790  0.682  0.717  0.742  0.663  0.543  0.473  0.459  0.331  0.262  0.219  0.199 
Earnings-to-price ratio  0.195  0.291  0.040  -0.153  -0.414  -0.391  -0.197  -0.134  -0.141  0.029  0.131  0.184* 
   0.273  0.282  0.277  0.266  0.251  0.239  0.218  0.207  0.208  0.180  0.162  0.111 
Book-to-Market ratio  -0.203  -0.148  -0.300*  -0.468***  -0.403***  -0.302**  -0.277*  -0.278*  -0.283**  -0.361***  -0.340***  -0.373*** 
   0.171  0.169  0.180  0.163  0.127  0.131  0.161  0.160  0.118  0.106  0.090  0.066 
Capital Expenditure  0.249  0.706  0.382  0.412  0.192  0.498  0.313  -0.196  0.512  0.418  0.374  0.122 
   0.704  0.697  0.673  0.550  0.555  0.551  0.526  0.572  0.535  0.450  0.418  0.339 
Constant  0.435  1.612  2.338  3.561***  3.334***  2.952***  2.451**  2.283**  1.311*  1.808***  1.902***  1.936*** 
   2.208  1.933  1.548  1.098  0.957  0.893  0.969  0.929  0.781  0.651  0.544  0.451 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  433  519  591  650  712  849  975  1,574  2,333  3,192  4,080  5,066 
R-squared  0.19  0.148  0.15  0.201  0.205  0.193  0.233  0.219  0.173  0.135  0.108  0.107 
Number of Unique Firms  138  150  157  162  172  246  272  737  1,014  1,231  1,425  1,648 
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Table 5, Panel A: OLS regression analysis - Impact on mean analysts’ recommendations for top two quartiles of mean house size 
   Time Period 
   1993-96  1993-97  1993-98  1993-99  1993-00  1993-01  1993-02  1993-03  1993-04  1993-05  1993-06  1993-07 
Dependent Variable  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec 
Total CSR Strengths  -0.087***  -0.079***  -0.068***  -0.055***  -0.049***  -0.023*  -0.016  0.009  0.011  0.013*  0.011  0.009 
   0.023  0.021  0.019  0.017  0.016  0.013  0.013  0.009  0.008  0.007  0.007  0.006 
Total CSR Concerns  -0.010  -0.006  -0.002  -0.003  -0.002  0.007  0.005  0.004  -0.007  -0.012  -0.013*  -0.011 
   0.018  0.016  0.014  0.014  0.013  0.011  0.012  0.010  0.009  0.008  0.008  0.007 
Number of Analysts  0.005  0.001  0.002  0.001  -0.002  -0.004*  -0.007***  -0.006***  -0.005***  -0.006***  -0.006***  -0.007*** 
   0.005  0.004  0.003  0.003  0.003  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002 
Mean House size  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.000*  -0.000*  -0.000*  -0.000**  -0.000***  -0.001***  -0.001*** 
   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Long Term Forecast Error  0.193  0.032  0.718  0.599  0.553  0.980***  0.389  0.406  0.159  -0.079  0.004  0.050 
   0.674  0.644  0.656  0.741  0.367  0.356  0.336  0.316  0.242  0.226  0.168  0.153 
Market Value (Size)  0.338***  0.246***  0.138***  0.069*  0.107***  0.126***  0.163***  0.169***  0.171***  0.164***  0.172***  0.159*** 
   0.061  0.049  0.043  0.036  0.033  0.031  0.027  0.024  0.023  0.021  0.020  0.018 
Market Adjusted Return  0.171***  0.167***  0.166***  0.119***  0.148***  0.148***  0.157***  0.152***  0.147***  0.125***  0.115***  0.117*** 
   0.038  0.031  0.029  0.021  0.017  0.016  0.015  0.015  0.013  0.013  0.012  0.012 
Intangibles  0.090  0.130  0.194  0.219  0.144  0.033  0.057  0.131  0.163*  0.222**  0.241***  0.283*** 
   0.217  0.161  0.157  0.153  0.146  0.131  0.110  0.101  0.094  0.087  0.081  0.075 
Return on Assets  0.332  0.562*  0.626**  0.837***  1.006***  0.726***  0.316*  0.248  0.262*  0.225*  0.189  0.221** 
   0.388  0.336  0.269  0.265  0.226  0.200  0.169  0.160  0.143  0.134  0.123  0.112 
Earnings-to-price ratio  0.139  0.062  -0.036  0.058  -0.164  -0.170  0.136*  0.153**  0.162***  0.170***  0.198***  0.176*** 
   0.183  0.180  0.158  0.163  0.136  0.117  0.080  0.066  0.061  0.059  0.060  0.048 
Book-to-Market ratio  -0.519***  -0.513***  -0.540***  -0.608***  -0.347***  -0.352***  -0.305***  -0.306***  -0.296***  -0.336***  -0.332***  -0.350*** 
   0.114  0.098  0.086  0.076  0.050  0.046  0.038  0.036  0.035  0.037  0.035  0.031 
Capital Expenditure  -0.214  0.042  0.035  0.173  0.217  0.356  0.431  0.296  0.214  0.135  0.174  0.210 
   0.559  0.477  0.435  0.357  0.342  0.315  0.302  0.265  0.244  0.234  0.222  0.197 
Constant  -1.220  0.181  1.772***  2.815***  2.158***  1.947***  1.438***  0.985***  1.377***  1.132***  1.423***  1.612*** 
   0.908  0.741  0.655  0.540  0.484  0.459  0.424  0.375  0.325  0.328  0.283  0.259 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1,218  1,557  1,916  2,297  2,710  3,479  4,269  5,440  6,673  7,957  9,213  10,494 
R-squared  0.208  0.191  0.185  0.257  0.259  0.251  0.395  0.376  0.343  0.299  0.276  0.256 
Number of Unique Firms  346  374  418  464  519  871  968  1,325  1,476  1,613  1,708  1,821 
  39 
 
Table 5, Panel B: OLS regression analysis - Impact on mean analysts’ recommendations for bottom two quartiles of mean house size  
   Time Period 
   1993-96  1993-97  1993-98  1993-99  1993-00  1993-01  1993-02  1993-03  1993-04  1993-05  1993-06  1993-07 
Dependent Variable  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec  meanrec 
Total CSR Strengths  -0.029  -0.059  -0.047  -0.023  -0.011  -0.047  -0.112***  -0.086**  -0.070**  -0.042**  -0.022  -0.018 
   0.070  0.074  0.074  0.068  0.066  0.048  0.039  0.035  0.030  0.020  0.018  0.017 
Total CSR Concerns  0.020  0.009  0.012  0.009  0.018  0.028  0.058  0.011  -0.014  0.010  0.012  0.010 
   0.067  0.064  0.058  0.052  0.052  0.046  0.044  0.042  0.027  0.020  0.019  0.019 
Number of Analysts  -0.012  -0.009  -0.004  -0.001  -0.004  -0.001  0.000  0.006  0.001  -0.010*  -0.005  -0.013*** 
   0.015  0.014  0.013  0.011  0.011  0.009  0.010  0.009  0.007  0.005  0.004  0.004 
Mean House size  -0.001  -0.001  0.001  0.001*  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
   0.002  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Long Term Forecast Error  -0.841  -0.553  0.372  0.440  0.675  0.448  0.335  0.699  0.057  0.110  -0.098  -0.104 
   1.400  1.390  1.242  1.222  1.014  0.970  0.930  0.843  0.537  0.388  0.328  0.262 
Market Value (Size)  0.375  0.269  0.086  -0.001  0.039  0.068  0.094  0.130  0.171**  0.123**  0.137***  0.132*** 
   0.240  0.204  0.151  0.103  0.084  0.081  0.080  0.092  0.068  0.050  0.043  0.035 
Market Adjusted Return  0.198*  0.275**  0.267***  0.184**  0.184***  0.185**  0.186***  0.231***  0.146***  0.111***  0.097***  0.103*** 
   0.104  0.108  0.097  0.084  0.067  0.072  0.070  0.066  0.034  0.026  0.022  0.021 
Intangibles  0.513  0.652  0.468  0.396  0.246  0.403  0.345  0.281  0.288  -0.023  -0.202  0.006 
   0.714  0.604  0.457  0.389  0.330  0.303  0.284  0.344  0.243  0.184  0.146  0.119 
Return on Assets  0.935  0.298  0.601  1.308  1.535**  1.469**  1.570***  1.161**  1.012***  0.847***  0.459**  0.405** 
   1.050  0.862  0.811  0.825  0.679  0.668  0.511  0.531  0.347  0.237  0.215  0.205 
Earnings-to-price ratio  0.382  0.895  0.360  -0.012  -0.497  -0.402  -0.247  -0.225  -0.013  0.089  0.361**  0.287** 
   0.573  0.550  0.552  0.492  0.396  0.408  0.282  0.200  0.190  0.159  0.162  0.134 
Book-to-Market ratio  -0.133  -0.157  -0.558**  -0.767***  -0.636***  -0.491**  -0.357**  -0.361**  -0.340***  -0.367***  -0.332***  -0.361*** 
   0.248  0.248  0.222  0.207  0.176  0.190  0.176  0.173  0.119  0.095  0.080  0.066 
Capital Expenditure  0.512  1.129  0.920  0.844  0.863  1.118  0.988  0.942  0.927*  0.665  0.652*  0.367 
   1.150  0.868  0.720  0.697  0.688  0.721  0.663  0.707  0.552  0.472  0.368  0.338 
Constant  -1.438  -0.012  2.515  4.071***  3.087***  2.930**  2.412**  2.000  1.751*  2.498***  2.373***  2.524*** 
   3.234  2.703  2.012  1.437  1.150  1.182  1.102  1.230  0.903  0.677  0.583  0.482 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  249  298  344  385  422  503  602  1,527  2,521  3,539  4,540  5,570 
R-squared  0.184  0.161  0.179  0.239  0.239  0.219  0.212  0.196  0.129  0.098  0.088  0.083 
Number of Unique Firms  81  86  91  96  98  143  181  995  1,249  1,427  1,583  1,759 
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Table 6: OLS regression analysis - Impact of CSR on analysts’ forecast error, adding years 
   Time Period 
   1993-96  1993-97  1993-98  1993-99  1993-00  1993-01  1993-02  1993-03  1993-04  1993-05  1993-06  1993-07 
Dependent Variable 
Forc. 
Error. 
Forc. 
Error. 
Forc. 
Error. 
Forc. 
Error. 
Forc. 
Error. 
Forc. 
Error. 
Forc. 
Error. 
Forc. 
Error. 
Forc. 
Error. 
Forc. 
Error. 
Forc. 
Error. 
Forc. 
Error. 
Total CSR Strengths  -0.001  -0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
   0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Total CSR Concerns  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
   0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Horizon Control  0.014  -0.014  0.005  -0.007  0.011  0.009  0.011  0.007  -0.006  0.003  -0.012  0.011 
   0.032  0.024  0.024  0.018  0.019  0.018  0.014  0.011  0.010  0.011  0.013  0.015 
Number of Analysts  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Market Value (Size)  0.015**  0.009**  0.010***  0.007***  0.004*  0.003  0.003  0.003  0.001  0.002  0.004**  0.003* 
   0.007  0.004  0.003  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.003  0.003  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002 
Market Adjusted Return  -0.006  -0.005**  -0.006***  -0.006***  -0.003**  -0.002**  -0.002**  -0.002  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002**  -0.002*** 
   0.004  0.003  0.002  0.002  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 
Intangibles  -0.010  -0.006  -0.010  -0.006  -0.004  -0.006  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004  -0.006*  -0.012***  -0.018*** 
   0.010  0.007  0.007  0.007  0.007  0.005  0.006  0.004  0.004  0.003  0.003  0.005 
Return on Assets  0.027  0.036  0.028  0.003  -0.004  -0.010  -0.014  -0.009  -0.006  0.000  -0.003  -0.017* 
   0.040  0.031  0.023  0.023  0.019  0.016  0.015  0.013  0.010  0.009  0.008  0.010 
Book-to-Market ratio  0.037*  0.028*  0.026**  0.015*  0.017*  0.017**  0.014*  0.013**  0.009*  0.013***  0.020***  0.030*** 
   0.020  0.016  0.012  0.009  0.009  0.008  0.007  0.006  0.005  0.004  0.004  0.005 
Capital Expenditure  -0.020  0.015  0.013  0.011  0.042*  0.043*  0.052***  0.037**  0.016  0.018  0.017  0.008 
   0.039  0.028  0.025  0.023  0.023  0.022  0.020  0.016  0.013  0.012  0.011  0.011 
Constant  -0.307*  -0.082  -0.182  -0.071  -0.114  -0.092  -0.100  -0.075  0.012  -0.043  0.001  -0.093 
   0.185  0.126  0.125  0.090  0.106  0.102  0.089  0.066  0.061  0.060  0.067  0.078 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1,542  1,939  2,358  2,802  3,280  4,136  5,042  7,287  9,661  12,079  14,446  16,880 
R-squared  0.065  0.056  0.063  0.043  0.053  0.052  0.034  0.027  0.015  0.017  0.028  0.069 
Number of Unique Firms  436  467  519  569  627  1,024  1,162  2,458  2,832  3,130  3,382  3,681 
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Figure 1: Estimated coefficients on CSR strengths (Table 3, Panel B) 
 
 
Figure 2: Estimated coefficients on CSR strengths for high and low legitimacy analysts (table 4) 
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